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Short-term versus long-term decision trade-offs: 
Evidence from a model-based observational 




Smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa recurrently face situations of complex and 
dynamic decision trade-offs. Short-term oriented activities such as fertilizer 
application help to cover immediate food needs, however compromise on future 
food production. Long-term oriented production activities such as building up soil 
fertility are important systemic leverage points, however, they compromise on 
today’s harvests. This article uses a semi-computerized observational experiment in 
Zambia to investigate farm management decision-making with conflicting production 
objectives in a dynamic context. The results reveal that, overall, Zambian smallholder 
farmers have a strong and significant preference for short-term oriented production 
activities, which leads to a suboptimal performance in production in the long term. A 
mind shift towards more long-term oriented production activities is required to 
sustainably increase food production. Our findings point at two things in this regard: 
First, we identify decision rules that successful performers have applied and that 
should be the basis for capacity building strategies. Second, we indicate that our 








Food insecurity and hunger are on the rise again in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), mostly 
because of conflict and climate change (FAO, 2017). The challenge to feed a growing 
and more demanding population is exacerbated, among others, by low levels of 
nutrients and organic matter in the soil and unsustainable water withdrawals (Foley 
et al., 2011). This highlights the urgent need for approaches that enhance food 
production in a sustainable way. Soil fertility and soil organic matter (SOM) play a 
central role in this context as they affect agricultural productivity in general and 
resource efficiency in particular (Kumwenda et al., 1997). Soils rich in SOM also have 
the potential to buffer external shocks such as droughts or unavailability of synthetic 
fertilizer (Gerber, 2016; Stave and Kopainsky, 2015). Currently, however, SOM levels 
are low in SSA, and replenishing SOM levels is a long-term process that conflicts with 
farmers’ short survival-oriented time horizons (Donovan and Casey, 1998). As a 
consequence, public agricultural policy in many SSA countries focuses to a large 
extent on efforts to increase synthetic fertilizer use through fertilizer subsidy 
programs (Banful, 2011; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). The application of synthetic 
fertilizer is effective in enhancing food production in the short-term. However, 
synthetic fertilizer application fails to effectively increase SOM stock levels in the 
long-run (Gerber, 2016; Morris et al., 2007). Farm practices such as conservation 
agriculture, among other things, improve soil fertility and accumulate SOM. 
International donors have therefore been promoting conservation agriculture in SSA 
for extended periods of time. However, conservation agriculture has so far not been 
able to play a dominant role to the extent that it could become a real alternative to 
fertilizer subsidy programs (Giller et al., 2009). This indicates a need to better 
understand how farmers make and adjust decisions, in this context, budget 
allocation decisions, over time.  
Farmers’ decisions on whether to allocate their available budget to a short-term 
solution (purchasing synthetic fertilizer) that compromises sustainable long-term 
production or to tolerate lower harvests today but increase food production in the 
future (investing in the replenishment of SOM) is representative for a wider family of 
decision trade-offs. These decision trade-offs are characterized by capability traps 
(Repenning & Sterman, 2001; Repenning & Sterman, 2002) or the archetype 
“shifting the burden” (Senge, 1990) and they are at the heart, among others, of 
sustainability transitions (in the agricultural context, e.g. Banson et al., 2016; 
Brzezina et al., 2017). In the “shifting the burden” terminology, the problem 
symptom of low yields can be relieved by the symptomatic solution, purchasing 
synthetic fertilizer. Continuous use of synthetic fertilizer, however, has two side 
effects: first, it diverts attention away from the fundamental source of the problem, 
i.e., low soil fertility. Second, it makes the application of the fundamental solution, 
the replenishment of soil organic matter, more and more difficult, thus reinforcing 
the perceived need for more synthetic fertilizer.  
The complexity of the decision trade-off in the context of farm budget allocation is 
increased by the fact that farmers make individual budget decisions that generate 
outcomes on several levels. Yield is specific to the individual farm. The aggregated 
production of individual farms, on the other hand, affects the market price and the 
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market price, in turn, determines the farm’s budget for the next growing season and 
thus for subsequent decisions on the individual farm level.  
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on dynamic decision 
making on the farm level and to understand what facilitates farmers to prioritize the 
fundamental solution to their sustainability challenge. We focus on maize dominated 
farming systems in Zambia. Zambia shares population growth and food insecurity 
challenges as well as food production system characteristics with many SSA 
countries. Zambia’s food production system consists predominantly of smallholder 
farmers who consume large shares of their harvests and only sell parts to generate 
cash (Tembo & Sitko, 2013). Maize is the staple food for a considerable number of 
people and it has accounted for more than half of the population’s total caloric 
intake since the mid 1980s (FAO, ). The literature about farm decision-making in 
Zambia is limited to topics such as adoption of technology (Grabowski et al., 2016; 
Langyintuo and Mungoma, 2008; Umar, 2014), identification of the household 
decision maker (Kalinda et al., 2000), production decisions in response to public 
market interventions (Mason and Jayne, 2013; Mason et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2009), 
normative decision modeling (Holden, 1993; Katongo, 1986), and static farm 
expenditure decisions (CSO, 2015). The dynamic nature of farm budget allocation to 
competing production activities, however, is largely overlooked in Zambia as well as 
in SSA at large.  
This article contributes to filling this gap by applying a dynamic, semi-computerized 
observational experiment to the case of maize-producing smallholder farms in 
Zambia. In the experiment, subjects iteratively decide on how to allocate a yield- and 
price-dependent budget between fertilizer purchases (representing a strategy to 
enhance maize production in the short run) and addition of organic matter to the 
soil (representing a strategy to enhance maize production in the long run, e.g., by 
retaining crop residues on the field or application of manure). Subjects’ individual 
decisions contribute to overall market outcomes such as total production and price. 
This has an impact of farm budget and thus on next year’s expenditures. While an 
experimental design that combines individual and aggregated outcomes complicates 
data analysis, it is important for two main reasons. First, it ensures external validity 
of the experiment in that it reflects the fragmented nature of agricultural product 
markets in SSA (The World Bank, 2013). Second, it adds transparency to the 
experiment in that subjects are fully aware of the fact that there are other players in 
their market (rather than abstractly formalized market participants in a simulation 
model). Despite suspicions of a strong preference for short-term rather than long-
terms solutions (cf. the high discount rates mentioned in Donovan and Casey, 1998 
or the effect of wealth on decisions under risk in prospect theory, Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) our approach is exploratory. This is grounded in the observation that 
so far, the high discount rates are based on assumptions rather than empirical 
evidence. Additionally, the complexity introduced by an interaction of individual and 
aggregated outcomes differentiates our case from other “shifting the burden” 
settings and makes hypothesis formulation and testing more difficult.  
Our study contributes to existing literature and to the policy debate in several ways. 
First, we corroborate previous assumptions that farmers prioritize short-term 
strategies over long-term strategies. Second, we find that the more successful 
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farmers decide dynamically based on farm and market information, while less 
successful farmers decide based on non-dynamic, a priori heuristics. Third, we test 
the different decision heuristics in a dynamic simulation model and find that the 
performance of some heuristics depends to a large extent on the endogenous 
interaction with the heuristics of other players in the same market. Fourth, we find 
that the semi-computerized observational experiment contributed to the formation 
of more dynamic decision heuristics and a deeper understanding of the dynamic 
complexity underlying farm decision making. Our findings are relevant to decision 
makers and practitioners as a base for sustainable policy formulation. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section the 
experimental design and analytical methods are described. Then, we present the 
results of the experiment, detect decision patterns and their underlying heuristics, 
and analyze the heuristics’ dynamic implications in terms of performance. Finally, we 
discuss our findings and draw conclusions based on the results and analyses. 
 
2 Experimental design and analytical methods 
2.1 Experimental design and setup 
We use a semi-computerized experiment of a five-player market justified in detail in 
Gerber (2017). The five players (subjects) in this market cannot communicate with 
each another to avoid collusive behavior. The experiment is based on a bio-
economic system dynamics model that investigates the dynamic interaction 
between fertilizer application, soil organic matter, maize production and maize 
availability in Zambia. This model integrates production theory, soil dynamics, plant 
nutrition, and commodity markets (Gerber, 2016). The model, originally developed 
for national-level policy analysis, was adjusted for the purpose of our experiment. 
The main adjustments include: constant population, constant arable land area, and 
differentiation of the production sector in the form of five farms (each managed by 
one subject). The model contains subject-specific sectors such as the farm sector as 
well as more general sectors such as the aggregated product market where subjects 
interact.  
The key element of the experiment is dynamic farm endowment. Dynamic farm 
endowment refers to the mechanism with which the current budget of subject i is 
determined. This depends on the market price at time t-1, subject i’s production, a 
non-linear share of the subject’s production that is sold and a constant share of the 
total farm income that is allocated to either fertilizer expenditures or investments in 
soil improvement. Each round, subjects decide on how to allocate their budget and 
once they make this decision, the simulation model advances by four years before 
new decisions can be formulated. The full model is specified in Vensim® and 
available as supplementary material. Figure 1 provides an overview of the model’s 
core feedback mechanisms. 
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Figure 1: Causal loop diagram of the system dynamics model (Gerber, 2017: 114). 
Notes: Variables in black are calculated for each subject individually, grey variables are aggregates. Arrows 
indicate causal relationships directed towards the arrowhead. A plus (+) at the arrowhead denotes a positive 
relationship (where the effect changes uniformly directed to the cause) and a minus (-) denotes a negative 
causality (where the effect changes reversely directed to the cause). Feedback loops consist of circular chains 
of causal relationships and are either reinforcing processes (which self-reinforce the current behavior) or 
balancing processes (which adjust the behavior towards a goal). R1: reinforcing soil improvement feedback 
loop; R2: reinforcing fertilizer feedback loop; R3: reinforcing soil organic matter feedback loop; B1: balancing 
supply feedback loop. 
Higher yields increase production, sales and farm income and thus a farm’s budget 
for the next growing season (R1- and R2-feedback loops, Figure 1). Higher yields, 
however, also increase aggregated market supply and thus lead to a lower price. This 
in turn lowers farm income and results in a lower budget for the next growing 
season (B1-feedbak loop). Through competition among subjects, the B1 loop thus 
partly offsets benefits from R1 and R2 loops. In addition to these market-centered 
mechanisms, the R3 loop describes key biological mechanisms. The addition of plant 
residues to the SOM stock increase yield and thus food availability and budgets with 
a delay. At the same time, SOM increases farms’ resilience to variations of external 
forces such as public policies (e.g. fertilizer subsidies). 
The experiment lasts nine rounds of four years each, in total 35 years. The four-year 
interval between decision points allows for soil dynamics to unfold before subjects 
need to make new decisions. As a result of the need to cover household needs, 
Zambian smallholder farmers maximize production rather than profits (Umar, 2014). 
Thus, we used total accumulated maize production of each subject as a performance 
criterion  
Figure 3 shows trajectories of this performance indicator for three illustrative cases: 
the benchmark or optimal allocation of fertilizer, a situation where the entire budget 
is allocated to fertilizer, and a situation where the entire budget is allocated to soil 
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adopted. After this initial period, however, long-term strategies outperform short-
term strategies and do so even more the more time progresses. 
We calculated a near-optimal allocation pattern of the percentage share of 
expenditure to fertilizer using a Powell hill-climbing algorithm. The resulting 
benchmark trajectory leads to the highest accumulated production under the 
premise that all five subjects apply the same strategy. According to Figure 2a, the 
highest accumulated production can be achieved if a subject starts by prioritizing soil 
improvement to build up SOM stocks (R1 and R3 loops, Figure 1). Subsequently, a 
somewhat higher share of the budget can be spent on fertilizer to capitalize on the 
short-term benefits of this solution. The last two rounds in the benchmark strategy 
show clear end-of game behavior where the entire budget is allocated to fertilizer 
purchases in order to boost short-term production (R2 loop). As subjects did not 
show any such end-of game behavior, we modified the benchmark strategy for the 
two last rounds to a strategy that uses a going concern perspective (Figure 2b).  
 
a) benchmark optimization b) benchmark going concern 
  
Figure 2: Benchmark share of budget spent on fertilizer 
 
a) accumulated maize production per subject b) percent deviation of accumulated maize 
production from benchmark 
  
Figure 3: Performance (accumulated maize production) trajectories for short- and 
long-term strategies as well as for benchmark strategy (Figure 3a). Percentage 
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2.2 Experimental procedure 
We recruited and trained local field officers1 who introduced and facilitated the 
experiments. The field officers helped subjects to understand the provided 
information and enter their decisions. However, they strictly avoided to advise on 
decisions or reveal structural properties of the simulation model beyond the 
information provided in the instructions. Experimental instructions were given 
verbally in local language following a standardized protocol (Appendix A). 
Instructions included information about the experimental farm (e.g. farm size and 
costs associated with the two decisions) and that all five players were endowed with 
farms identical in size and initial bio-economic characteristics. Instructions also 
explained the objective of the experiment, namely for participants to maximize their 
accumulated maize production over the entire period of the experiment.  
Due to varying degrees of literacy and the rural context in which we were operating 
(low familiarity with computers necessity to perform the experiment outdoors), we 
applied a semi-computerized approach to data entry and outcome feedback. The 
experiment leader entered information about current market price and own current 
yield, production and budget on a physical record sheet for each subject (Appendix 
B). Field officers also communicated this information verbally before subjects 
decided on how to allocate their budget to the two expenditure categories. Field 
officers then transmitted the record sheets to the experiment leader who entered all 
five players’ decisions in the simulation model and calculated the new market price, 
yield, production and budget as a basis for the next decision.  
Experiments lasted between one and one and a half hours. Experiments were 
followed by a facilitated debriefing session in which farmers were asked to reflect on 
their decision strategy and to provide additional, qualitative information about their 
decisions.  
Performance in the experiment was rewarded by five standardized, physical rewards 
that farmers need in everyday life2. The best performer could choose a reward first, 
then the second, until only one reward remained for the last participant. The legal 
and cultural context (e.g. strict rules related to gambling) made physical rewards 
rather than monetary rewards necessary. Monetary rewards would most likely also 
have distracted subjects from the farm mind-set, which we wanted to analyze. A 
final argument in favor of physical rewards is that choosing a reward based on the 
performance position within the group acknowledges the subjective normative 
judgment of different items (Kelly et al., 2015).  
2.3 Subjects 
The experiments were conducted in August 2016 in villages around Mumbwa, in 
Zambia’s Central province. The main language in the villages is Tonga. Subjects were 
 
1 The field officers were local people that were trained in three steps: 1. The field officers took part in 
the experiment as subjects. 2. The field officers made supervised trial introductions and data 
collection among themselves. 3. The field officers were supervised and received feedback in the real 
experimental setting.  
2 2kg sugar, 1kg sugar, 750ml cooking oil, big laundry soap and small laundry soap 
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recruited from smallholder farm communities. Thus, all subjects were real decision-
makers on farms; however, they had no previous experience in related experiments. 
A total of 15 experiments were conducted. With five players per experiment the 
overall subject pool comprised 75 farmers. None of the subjects participated in more 
than one experiment. Through the oral and written communication in the course of 
the experiment, we could assure that the subjects understood their experimental 
farm and the information they received. The subjects were engaged in the 
experiment and took the decisions carefully. Many of them made calculations on 
mobile phones, with pen and paper, or even in sandy soil. From the subjects’ 
reaction during the presentation of the reward items and the award ceremony, it 
was clear that the physical items motivated the subjects to perform well. The order 
in which the reward items were chosen varied. This indicates differences in 
subjective normative judgments of the items and indicates some justification for the 
choice of physical rewards. 
 
3 Results 
Subjects made decisions on fertilizer and soil improvement expenditure in absolute 
terms, as they would on their real farms. However, given that a subject’s individual 
budget also depends on other subjects’ decisions in the same market, absolute 
decisions and decision outcomes cannot be compared to each other. For this reason, 
we analyzed expenditure relative to the available budget. We report on and analyze 
results in terms of the share of the total available budget a subject spent on fertilizer 
at each decision point. The share of the budget spent on soil improvement is the 
remaining share of the budget. 
3.1 Performance 
Figure 4 shows the 95 percent confidence interval for the share of the budget spent 
on fertilizer over all markets and all subjects (area spanned by the grey solid lines 
and labeled “results”). The dotted line represents the benchmark. On average, 
subjects start by spending between around 50 and 70% of their budget on fertilizer, 
rather than the 30% indicated by the benchmark. Their relative fertilizer 
expenditures increase over the duration of the experiment. The share of the budget 
spent on fertilizer is significantly different from the benchmark share and it is 
significantly higher than the benchmark in all years (one sample t-test, p < 0.01). 
Subjects therefore show a significant bias towards fertilizer, the short-term solution 
to increasing agricultural production.  
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Figure 4: Benchmark (black dashed line) and 95 percent confidence intervals (grey 
solid lines) for share of budget spent on fertilizer. 
 
 
3.2 Decisions and decision strategies 
Figure 5 displays individual decision trajectories of all subjects, that is, the time-
dependent trajectory of the share of the budget spent on fertilizer. The decision 
trajectories are grouped into the 15 markets of the experiment. The figure illustrates 
that decision trajectories vary between subjects as well as between markets.  
Figure 5: Benchmark and decision trajectories of the subjects in the 15 markets. 
    
    
    
    
 
The emphasis on fertilizer (rather than on soil improvement) expenditure, in 
combination with the varying decision and performance patterns revealed by Figure 
4 and Figure 5, led us to further investigate the mechanisms linking decisions and 
performance. For this purpose, Figure 6 plots the decision trajectories of the top 
20% (left hand side of the figure, n=15) and the bottom 20% subjects (right hand side 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































ranked first in their respective experiment. The bottom 20% subjects, on the other 
hand, are those participants who ranked last (5) in their experiment.  
a) Rank 1 subjects b) Rank 5 subjects 
  
Figure 6: Decision trajectories of the top 20% performers (Figure 7a) and the bottom 
20% performers (Figure 7b), benchmark strategy grey dashed line. 
 
The decision trajectories of the bottom 20% performers differed significantly from 
the benchmark throughout the time horizon of the experiment (one sample t-test, p 
< 0.01). This was only partly the case for the decision trajectories of the top 20% 
performers. The decisions of those subjects were not significantly different from the 
benchmark in the initial periods (one sample t-test, p < 0.01).  
From Figure 6, a few patterns in terms of decision rules can be discerned. Subjects 
belonging to the bottom 20% performers had a very strong preference for fertilizer 
(80% and more of the total expenditure). In addition, they seem to have decided on 
fertilizer expenditure without giving much attention to the development of farm 
(i.e., yield, production) and market (i.e., price) information, that is, they seem to 
have followed a non-dynamic, a priori defined fertilizer strategy. This is reflected in 
the low variance in decisions among the bottom 20% performers in Figure 7. One 
subject, during the debriefing session, explained this strategy with the following 
statement: “Fertilizer works, we spent large shares of the budget to fertilizer 
purchases and didn’t care about the other option”. 
The successful subjects belonging to the top 20% performers started with relatively 
low fertilizer expenditures. In cases where they started with high fertilizer 
expenditures, they lowered them considerably in the second decision period (year 
2019). Thus, they initially focused on the long-term strategy of soil improvement. 
Then, they repeatedly adjusted their decisions based on dynamic farm and market 
information cues, which can be inferred from the high variance in decisions among 
the top 20% performers in Figure 7.  
As a consequence of the differences in decision strategies between the top and 
bottom performers, the variance within the different groups develops differently 
over the time horizon of the experiment. Figure 7 plots the standard deviation of 
rank 1 subjects (solid black line) as well as the standard deviation of rank 5 subjects 
(dotted grey line). Especially in the early years of the experiment, the variance in 
decisions among rank 1 subjects is considerably higher than that of rank 5 subjects. 


















































improvement right away while others only decided to do so at the second decision 
point. Variance for this group also remains somewhat higher throughout the 
remainder of the experiment, which is likely because rank 1 subjects continuously 
adjusted their fertilizer expenditure decisions based on new farm and market 
information.  
The trajectory of variance for the more moderate performers shows an interesting 
increase in the second half of the experiment. Overall, subjects in these groups 
applied more static decision rules than top performing subjects (Table 1). However, 
after a while, about half of the more moderate performers try out reductions in 
fertilizer expenditure and corresponding increases in soil improvement expenditure. 
This is reflected in the increase in variance as of the year 2035. During the final two 
decision points, subjects align again towards high fertilizer expenditure.  
 
Figure 7: Variance in decisions of the top performers (rank 1) and the bottom 
performers (rank 5). 
 
3.3 Robustness of strategies 
One of the core features of our experiment is that the budget a subject can allocate 
to either fertilizer or soil improvement not only depends on the subject’s own 
decisions in the previous period and their outcomes but also on the interaction of an 
individual decision with the decisions of others. In order to test the robustness of 
successful decision strategies, we therefore performed simulations where we 
combined successful decision strategies with unsuccessful decision strategies. Figure 
8 shows the results of various such combinations. It differentiates between subjects 
in a market who follow the average strategy of the top 20% performers and subjects 
who focus entirely on fertilizer. The left-hand side of the figure shows performance 
outcome for the one subject in the market that always follows the top 20% strategy 
while the right-hand side of the figure shows performance outcomes for the one 
subject that always follows the short-term strategy. The figure demonstrates that 
overall, the differences in performance for a selected farm are fairly low. The 
successful decision strategies therefore seem to be quite robust to the experiment’s 





























rank 1 standard deviation rank 5 standard deviation
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a) farm 1 (always top 20% strategy) b) farm 5 (always short-term strategy) 
  
Figure 8: Performance (accumulated maize production) of an individual farm under 
varying combinations of other farms’ strategies. Left hand side: farm that always 
chooses the top 20% strategy; right hand side: farm that always chooses a purely 
short-term strategy 
Notes: 
4 opt 1 short: 4 subjects adopt optimal (benchmark) strategy, 1 subject follows a short-term strategy 
3 opt 2 short: 3 subjects adopt optimal (benchmark) strategy, 2 subjects follow a short-term strategy 
2 opt 3 short: 2 subjects adopt optimal (benchmark) strategy, 3 subjects follow a short-term strategy 
1 opt 4 short: 1 subject adopts optimal (benchmark) strategy, 4 subjects follow a short-term strategy 
 
4 Discussion  
Producing enough food for a growing and more demanding population remains a 
challenge in Zambia and in SSA at large. Smallholder farming systems in particular 
suffer from natural resource-based poverty traps (Stephens et al., 2012) so that 
sustainable intensification of agricultural production remains impossible as long as 
the natural resource base is being depleted. Replenishment of natural resources in 
general and soil organic matter, which is at the heart of soil fertility, in specific 
involves a fundamental shift in farmers’ behavior away from the continuous and 
ever-increasing application of synthetic fertilizer, a symptomatic solution to 
stubbornly low yields.  
Feedback on alternative production activities is slow in farming systems and it is very 
ambiguous, among others as a result of compounding factors such as climatic (e.g., 
variability in precipitation and temperature), biological (e.g. pests, weeds and 
diseases) and socio-economic developments (e.g., price volatility, illness of on-farm 
labor). Because of the delays between activity and outcomes, the signals/feedback 
from soil improvement activities are much weaker than the feedback from the 
application of synthetic fertilizer. Competing advice from experts (e.g. government-
employed extension services promoting fertilizer application vs. donor-employed 
extension services promoting conservation agriculture) complicates matters. In the 
absence of effective support and a fundamental understanding of the dynamic 
complexity underlying production activities and their outcomes, farmers are prone 
to draw the wrong conclusions from the information they receive, both on-farm and 
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In line with expectations from various streams of literature, our data from a semi-
computerized observational experiment with smallholder farmers in Zambia shows 
that overall, participants in our experiment had a strong and significant preference 
for decisions that are effective in the short-run but decrease food system outcomes 
and their resilience in the long-run.  
The distinct preference for short-term strategies could be an explaining hypothesis 
why long-term oriented policies such as the dissemination of conservation 
agriculture face difficulties in terms of scaling up (Giller et al., 2009). While short-
term oriented policies such as fertilizer subsidy programs (FSP) are compatible with 
farmers’ mind set, long-term oriented policies are not. Thus, to achieve the scaling 
up of long-term oriented strategies, a mind shift in farmers’ decision-making is 
required, for example through agricultural extension. The empirical underpinning of 
the strong tendency of farmers to favor short-term solutions is also important 
because the majority of government policies support short-term solutions. A mind 
shift towards more long-term oriented strategies is thus equally important for policy 
makers, donors and implementing institutions.  
While the finding on a distinct preference for the symptomatic solution (application 
of synthetic fertilizer) is not surprising per se, the experimental results give rise to a 
number of possible complementary interpretations and insights. These combine high 
discount rates on the side of smallholder farmers stuck in natural resource-based 
poverty traps with a higher weight on risk aversion than potential gains, too slow 
outcome feedback and lack of trust in the effectiveness of the fundamental solution 
to the symptom of low yields.  
4.1 How to move to the fundamental solution  
The fundamental solution to the shifting the burden archetype is represented by the 
optimal solution or benchmark decision strategy in the experiment. When exploring 
the link between decisions and performance, we found both, dynamic and non-
dynamic decision trajectories that resulted in different performance outcomes. 
Deciding dynamically alone, that is, basing decisions on the outcome feedback 
provided by the simulation model, does not guarantee success. Instead we found 
two pre-conditions or drivers of success for dynamic decision trajectory that results 
in above-average performance in terms of production and thus facilitates 
implementation of the fundamental solution. First, the most successful subjects 
initially focused on replenishing SOM stocks before reaping the short-term benefits 
of applying inorganic fertilizer. This criterion is necessary to trigger the food 
production system’s long-term leverage point. In a second step, successful subjects 
dynamically adjusted their decisions based on farm and market information. This 
criterion is necessary but not sufficient. Subjects who do adjust their decisions 
dynamically do not perform better than other subjects unless, and only unless they 
prioritize soil organic matter replenishment at the outset. Dynamic adjustment is 
thus only beneficial if the first condition is met. 
Implementation of these two success factors in practice requires complementary 
interventions. A precondition for both factors is building awareness and 
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understanding of the dynamic complexity underlying the budget allocation decision 
trade-off. We discuss this in more detail in the subsequent sub-section.  
As replenishment of SOM takes considerable time to substantially increase 
production and thus creates a severe conflict with the need for reaching short-term 
benefits, interventions aiming at increasing SOM will have to be combined, at least 
in the initial years, with the application of synthetic fertilizer to reduce the trade-off 
between short- and long-term objectives. On-farm research trials in smallholder 
production systems in Uganda have shown that such a strategy produces both 
agronomic and economic benefits (Kearney et al., 2012). The need for policy to make 
long-term investments more affordable and profitable is also in line with related 
studies in system dynamics that investigate the trade-offs between short-term and 
long-term investments. Rahmandad (2015), for example, shows that competitive 
markets promote firms with a focus on short-term performance and make 
investments in long-term capabilities extremely unprofitable.  
Implementation of the second success factor to decision making, the dynamic 
adjustment of decisions based on outcome feedback, can be facilitated by record 
keeping. The most appropriate agent for this is most likely agricultural extension. 
Debriefing comments by experiment participants indicated that participants had 
learned about the importance of record keeping (cf. subsequent sub-section). This 
perception by participants is substantiated by empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of record keeping. In another study in Zambia, we found that 
smallholder farmers improved their livelihood situation (as measured, for example, 
by food availability in the traditional hunger season) when they monitored important 
stock variables such as livestock numbers, land under cultivation, food harvested, 
available food on storage, or available household cash on a monthly basis (Kopainsky 
et al., 2017). Similar results were found for example in India (Eyhorn, 2007).  
4.2 Semi-computerized experiment as nudging tool 
Similar to other natural resource management issues (e.g., Moxnes, 2004), farmers 
seem to have difficulties in formulating appropriate mental models of the soil 
organic matter stock management problem. Replenishment of the SOM stock 
requires several years of adding more SOM to the soil than retrieving SOM from the 
soil through harvesting. 
During the debriefing session after the experiment, subjects provided some 
qualitative background information about their decision rules and strategies. They 
also reported on insights they had gained from the experiment. Despite the 
unambiguous statement in the introduction to the experiment that we were 
gathering information for research purposes, the subjects expressed that they 
themselves learned a lot from the experiment. Common learning outcomes stated 
by the subjects included the following: the importance of planning; the importance 
of dynamic book keeping; differentiating between short-term and long-term 
production activities and knowing their impacts; and differentiating between the 
concepts of yield and production.  
The anecdotal evidence on learning is also substantiated by our data. Among the 
less-well performing subjects, many of them started exploring the soil improvement 
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strategy in the second half of the experiment (hence the increases in variation in the 
second half of the experiment in Figure 7). This shift in strategy was too late for soil 
improvements to have a significant impact on subjects’ performance. Nevertheless, 
it can be seen as an indication of subjects starting to understand the need for long-
term strategies. 
Our semi-computerized observational experiment therefore seems to also have 
functioned as a digital nudging instrument (Weinmann et al., 2016) and guided 
subjects’ decisions towards a more desirable behavior. Even in the absence of any 
instructional overlay, the model-based experiment led to some new insights. In 
order to exploit the potential as a nudging instrument more, the experiment would 
have to be used in settings that allow repeated and probably also more collaborative 
interactions with the underlying simulation model. Farmers need to trust that a less 
common strategy such as the long-term soil improvement strategy can lead to 
reliable outcomes. Engaging with the simulation model just once is not sufficient in 
that regard, especially when the simulation model provides outcome feedback 
alone, which has been shown to be too slow to fundamentally affect performance 
(e.g., Moxnes, 2004; Sterman, 1994).  
Simulation-based learning tools have the additional benefit that they provide a way 
to circumvent the complexities and disagreements introduced by discounting. 
Moxnes (2014) shows that people are able to choose among policies (in our case, 
production activities) by inspecting graphs over time of policy consequences.  
 
5 Conclusions and further research 
Findings from experimental studies are non-conclusive in the sense that they 
originate from a laboratory environment and not from a real-world context. External 
validity of experiment-based findings is thus a common concern and ultimately 
needs empirical confirmation. There is evidence from prior research, however, that 
the correspondence between lab- and field-based effects of conceptually similar 
dependent and independent variables is considerable (e.g. Anderson et al., 1999) 
and we believe that our experimental design, which was as close to the subjects’ 
situation on their farms as possible, contributed to the potential of external validity 
in regard to our findings. In particular the use of a complex model that included time 
delays and dynamic endogeneity, and that was calibrated using Zambian data, 
allowed to mimic a farmer’s real-world decision tradeoff. 
While this article reveals insights about dynamic decision making of SSA smallholder 
farmers in the context of short- and long-term oriented production activities with 
conflicting objectives, there are several ways to expand and complement our 
research. We found that some of the subjects decided on a priori heuristics that we 
could not explain with our study design. However, to further develop agricultural 
extension towards long-term oriented production activities, knowledge about the 
foundation of a priori heuristics might be useful. Our study design could be enriched 
by individual, semi-structured interviews with all subjects after the completion of the 
experiment. These interviews would allow to gather qualitative information about 
these a priori heuristics and help building adaptive capacity rather than promote the 
broadest possible diffusion of technical training.  
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Most importantly, the simulation model currently used as the basis for the 
observational experiment should be further developed into an interactive learning 
tool or learning activity that is accessible to extension officers and farmers alike. This 
would help turning the anecdotal evidence of learning from the simulation to more 
measurable and particularly more scalable learning impacts that are a crucial 
precondition for moving towards the fundamental solution to low yields in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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Appendix A: Data Collection Protocol 
 
1. Gather the participants (5 couples, that in real life each actually run a farm 
together). 
2. Introduction and Instructions: 
Hello and welcome everybody.  
Introduction of all that are present 
A. Purpose 
Thank you for being here. Today we gather information for learning how you make 
different decisions. Andreas is doing a schoolwork study for his PhD in collaboration 
with Dr. Nyanga at UNZA3. He is interested in learning how you make decisions as 
couples. The information will be used for academic purposes and may be published 
in academic journals. Is that clear and ok for you? 
B. Roles 
We would like to gather the information through playing a game together. The roles 
are: I am the moderator, who will interact with you. Andreas is the computer man, 
who will be putting the information in the computer and giving the results. Cain and 
Eukeria will help me moderating the process, transmitting information between you 
and the computer man. You, the couples, are the players who make decisions. 
C. Game 
Every couple will manage a farm. You all have a common main goal for your farm. In 
this game the main goal is to maximize your accumulated maize production over the 
whole game. To reach the goal of maximize your production, you must decide how 
much money (Kwachas) you want to spend on two options. The first option is buying 
own fertilizer (not through government or NGO subsidies). And the second option is 
spending financial means to improve your soil through crop residue retention and 
manure application. In this game we just have these two options and we are not 
considering other options such as lime application, crop rotation, Musangu tree 
plantation, etc. 
Here is some information to understand your farm: Each couple cultivates 8 limas 
(equivalent to 2 hectares) of maize on its farm, so your decisions are limited to this 
area. The maize yield level is currently around 7 bags of 50kg per lima; the 
current/starting production therefore is around 60 bags of 50kg per farming season. 
The current/starting producer price of maize at your market is around 75 Kwacha 
per 50kg bag. 
In the beginning your budget for the two options is 1392 Kwacha. In the first option, 
which is buying fertilizer, a 50 kg bag of fertilizer cost 550 Kwacha. In the second 
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option, which is crop residue retention and manure application, a lima costs you 117 
Kwacha, adding external organic matter becomes more expensive. 
For you to make decisions, the moderator will come to you and give you information 
about your budget, yield, current production and market price. You will then decide 
how much of the budget you want to spend on fertilizer and how much you want to 
spend to improve your soils. The moderator will take note of your decision and bring 
it to Andreas. He will put your decision into the computer and calculate the new 
budget, yield, production and price. The moderator will bring this new information 
back to you so that you can again decide how much money you will spend for 
fertilizers and soil improvement. We will have 9 rounds in this game. Thus, these 
dynamics will continue until we complete 9 periods (you make 9 decisions). The 
game will be completed in 1-2 hours approximately. 
At the end of the game, the computer calculates your total production for the entire 
game and you will be rewarded with a present depending on your results. We 
brought a couple of items of which the best performing couple can choose one item 
first, the second best performing couple second, etc. 
Show the goods (2kg sugar, 1kg sugar, 750ml oil, big laundry soap, small laundry 
soap) 
If you have difficulties to make your decision, think of how you decide on your own, 
real farm and always keep in mind that your goal is to maximize your production! 
We will have the possibility to clarify procedural questions during the game, but not 
ask for help in decision making. So far, is the game clear to you? Are you willing to 
participate? If you do not want to participate or feel uncomfortable, you can 
withdraw. 
 
Remarks to the instructor: 
It is ok to clarify procedural questions: e.g. what happens after we make a decision? 
Do we have to spend the entire budget to these two policies? Etc. 
It is also ok to clarify the meaning of words (e.g. yield) 
Do not give clues that may directly influence the decision making process. E.g. do not 
answer questions regarding what should be done such as “should I allocate more on 
fertilizers?” or  “How can I make the highest production in the game?” 
 
3. Split the participants up. 
In this game it is the idea that you keep your decisions and results as a secret within 
your farm and do not share them with the other couples. So please, keep 
communication between the farms at a low level. However, once the game is finished 
and we have all the results from everyone, you are very free to share experiences and 
strategies with each other! 
Give your best and good luck!! 
4. Start the actual rounds. 
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After first round: explain that yield, production, price and budget changes. Costs stay 
the same. 
5. Save the rounds. 
Take a copy (soft or hard) from the interaction sheets and save it. 
Give a hard copy to the farmers as a feedback. 
6. Conclude with an aftermath session. 
At this point the game is over and you are free to leave if you wish. However, if you 
appreciate, we will have a feedback session explaining some ideas of the game.   
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Appendix B: Record Sheet 
Farm Number:________            Data Collection Set-Nr:___ 





Round Yield Production Price Budget Soil Fertilizer 
 
0 7 bags/lima 60 bags 75 ZMW/bag 1392 ZMW 
  
 Price Yield Production Budget Soil Fertilizer 
1       
 
 Production Price Yield Budget Soil Fertilizer 
2       
 
 Yield Production Price Budget Soil Fertilizer 
3       
 
 Price Yield Production Budget Soil Fertilizer 
4       
 
 Production Price Yield Budget Soil Fertilizer 
5       
 
 Yield Production Price Budget Soil Fertilizer 
6       
 
 Price Yield Production Budget Soil Fertilizer 
7       
 
 Production Price Yield Budget Soil Fertilizer 
8       
 
 Yield Production Price Budget Total Production 
9     
 
  
Date: _____________    Place: _____________ 
 
Note: The order of soil and fertilizer expenditure alternates from round to round to avoid any order 
driven bias. 
Input prices: 
- 50 kg Fertilizer costs 550 ZMW 
- 1 lima improved soil costs 117 
ZMW, for further improvement the 
price increases 
